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ABSTRACT: 
The purpose of this paper is to summarize 
from an ESCO viewpoint some of the risks and 
rewards of participating in DSM bidding programs 
before deciding to submit a bid. 
TEXT: 
During the last two decades, utilities have 
sought to avoid the need for increased generation 
capacity by investing in customer end use 
efficiency. This investment effort has occured 
through internally managed conservation programs 
and within the past several years, supplemented by 
all-source and DSM bidding programs. Energy 
Service Companies (ESCOs) have participated 
extensively in these bidding programs by acting as 
third party contractors who purchase, finance, 
install and operate conservation equipment at utility 
customer facilities in return for utility payments 
based on measured kW or kwh savings over a ten 
to fifteen year term. 
The rewards are more difficult to specify 
than the risks primarily because bidding programs 
are still in their infancy. The rewards of bidding 
programs for the ESCO include: 
Opportunities for fair returns on 
investments including the risks, and; 
Opportunities for additional transactions 
with utility customers by providing more 
mmnrehensive services hevnnd the .scone nf the 
Regulatory support of bid programs. 
Following is an elaboration of some of the 
risks associated with participation by ESCOs in 
utility sponsored DSM programs: 
1. Utility Competition 
ESCOs seeking to participate in utility 
sponsored DSM bidding programs must evaluate 
current and planned rebate and/or customized 
programs budgeted by utilities. The 
implementation of direct utility/customer sponsored 
programs can have a major impact on the ESCO's 
ability to sell contracted bidded capacity to the 
utility's customers. 
In order to bid successfully, ESCOs must 
make a substantial upfront investment in the 
preparation and negotiation of a utility bid. One 
concern of ESCOs is that the market opportunity 
solicited in the utility bid will be eroded by 
expansion of non-bidding programs and/or by 
future regulatory rulemaking allowing for new 
utility programs which compete directly with the 
ESCO's bid program. 
ESCOs are ever mindful of the 
consequences of competing with existing and new 
utility sponsored conservation programs. This is 
especially true when new programs are introduced 
during the period of time when ESCOs are 
obligated under contract with the utility to deliver 
capacity and energy to the utility. Introduction of 
:w programs by the utility can confuse the 
tility's customers as to which conservation 
rograms offer the best deal. The utility customer 
lay appreciate having the choice between utility 
)onsored rebate programs and third party service 
roviders. However, from an ESCO viewpoint, 
~mpetition with utility sponsored programs can 
-ode the market and thereby result in penalties to 
le ESCO. 
ESCOs can perform a useful function for 
le utility's customers and shareholders by 
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delivering verifiable energy and capacity at a price 
competitive with alternative sources of supply. 
Within that context, an effective ESCO - utility 
relationship will emphasize cooperation to meet the 
utility's short and long term load management 
objectives. 
However, a barrier to that cooperative 
relationship exists in the arena of new program 
development whereby a utility can effectively 
exclude ESCOs from the market by undertaking 
conservation programs which do not allow the use 
of performance based contractors, and which use 
their customer data base to market those programs. 
To address that barrier, ESCOs have proposed to 
eliminate any economic bias against third party 
providers of conservation services by ensuring that 
savings by third party providers would earn utility 
shareholders an incentive return equal to what 
shareholders would earn under monopoly 
conditions. 
Some utilities have employed a 
collaborative planning approach which has allowed 
interested parties to participate in the development 
of bidding program design and thereby strengthen 
the link between utility customer needs and utility 
program design. In this manner, utility programs 
need not compete with one another, and market 
niches can be linked with the appropriate program 
delivery mechanisms be they through third party 
contractors, utility rebates, direct utility financing 
or a standard offer. 
In summary, ESCO concern over utility 
competition is driven by a need for protection 
against significant damages under their existing 
contracts as much as a desire for participation in 
future markets. More importantly, ESCO 
competition with utility sponsored programs can be 
mitigated in the program design phase by the 
- identification of specific customer and utility needs 
and linking those needs to the appropriate internal 
or third party delivery vehicles. 
2. Changes in Utility Load Requirements 
Changes in utility load requirements can 
impact the business environment for both the utility 
and the ESCO. When load requirements fall below 
projections, the utility will be less likely to embrace 
a DSM bid program, especially if the load shortfall 
occurs between the issuance of a bid solicitation 
and the announcement of a final award group. 
Understandibly, the utility is not interested in 
supporting conservation programs which will result 
in lost revenues (especially if there exists no 
revenue loss recovery and/or the utility has excess 
capacity). Similarly, ESCOs will be wary about 
committing the required resources to bid on a 
changing auction block size. 
3. The Overall Economic Strength of the Utility 
Service Territory 
The overall strength of the utility service 
territory will have a direct impact on utility 
customer operating hours. When annual operating 
hours fall below a certain level, payments for 
savings from the utility to the ESCO do not offset 
the project fixed and variable costs. This is 
because utilities will not pay ESCOs for 
conservation resulting from reduced operating 
hours. The principal risk to the ESCO in its 
agreement with the utility is the continued ability to 
deliver capacity over a fixed term. In a weak 
market economy, customers will be reluctant to 
commit to long term agreements which include 
performance requirements related to operating 
hours. 
4. Regulatory Support of Bid Programs 
Regulatory clarity is essential in order for 
the utility and ESCOs to work together in an 
effective manner. A fundamental ESCO concern is 
the existence of "regulatory out" clauses which do 
not bind the rulings of a current regulatory body to 
rulings of a future body. An example is the 
possibility of a disallowance of previously approved 
utility - ESCO contracts resulting from a regulatory 
prudency review. 
Additional issues requiring regulatory 
clarity include revenue loss recovery, cost 
effectiveness criteria for project acceptance by the 
utility, and cross class subsidy issues. From the 
ESCO viewpoint, it is preferable to have clear, 
consistent policies upon which to make a business 
decision to invest resources in a bid. 
Other Factors in Deciding to Bid and 
Implement an Awarded Program 
ESCOs consider additional factors in 
deciding whether to bid a request for proposal and 
implement a negotiated agreement. 
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1. ESCOs look at the probability of profitability. 
As discussed previously, this is a function of the 
strength of the regulatory environment in which 
the utility operates, the economic health of the 
utility's service territory, the transaction costs 
incurred during development and implementation of 
an awarded bid, and the existing utility programs 
that its customers can use for DSM project 
implementation. 
2. ESCOs consider the market potential for 
matching the utility's customer technology needs 
with the specific ESCO's expertise. Some ESCOs 
specialize in particular residential, industrial or 
commercial/institutional market niches. Within 
each of those market niches, ESCOs may have 
further developed engineering specialties with 
respect to the design, installation and monitoring of 
individual technologies such as lighting, motors, 
variable frequency drives, thermal storage systems 
and industrial process. 
3. ESCOs examine the available business 
opportunities for installation of DSM measures 
within the utility's service territory. Those 
opportunities are a function of local economic 
conditions, types of facilities available for 
conservation implementation, penetration of existing 
utility conservation programs, and the availability 
of qualified contractors to install, monitor and 
maintain equipment. 
4. A third factor is the treatment of environmental 
externalities especially as related to the Clean Air 
act of 1991. Utilities will be eligible for pollution 
bonuses by successfully engaging in DSM 
activities. To the extent that DSM results are 
marketable through emissions trading, the utility 
can market their pollution bonuses to other utilities 
based on measured conservation results. 
Generating emissions trading opportunities for 
utilities mav create business o~~ortuni t ies  for
know what results they are paying for especially if 
there is a contribution based on a percentage of 
actual savings. The ESCO will want to know 
revenues to be paid by both the customer and the 
utility based on the performance of the installed 
equipment. In addition, an ESCO will want to 
identify material changes that occur in operating 
hours and facility usage during the term of the 
agreement with the utility customer. 
Factors which enhance a successful 
measurement plan include: cost effectiveness of 
obtaining monitored results; ability to measure 
technology specific installations and interactive 
effects including reduction in maintenance costs; 
and flexibility to include new technologies as they 
are developed during the term of the contracts 
between the utility, ESCO and customer. 
6. An underlying premise of performance 
contracting, especially in the DSM bidding arena, 
is the allocation of risk between the utility, the 
customer and the ESCO. Within DSM bid 
programs, two agreements are in place: one 
between the ESCO and the utility and one between 
the ESCO and each utility customer. 
The sponsoring utility contracts with an 
ESCO to market conservation services to utility 
customers with the objective of delivering measured 
energy and capacity to the utility over a period of 
time. If energy and capacity are not delivered and 
maintained on a sustained basis by the ESCO, 
payment for savings by the utility will not be made 
to the ESCO. In addition, liquidated damages and 
penalty fees may be paid by the ESCO to the utility 
in the event that project acceptance and savings do 
not occur. 
The ESCO negotiates and maintains an 
Energy Services Agreement (ESA) with the utility 
customer. The agreement outlines the obligations 
of each party to the agreement with respect to 
customer operating hours, types of equipment to be 
installed, and customer payments if any to the 
ESCO. For many common conservation measures. 
the risk of non-performance of the equipment 
primarily centers around the operating hours of the 
facility. Reduced operating hours will result in 
reduced savings from installed equipment and 
reduced payments from the utility. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
Clear policies and pricing signals from 
ESL-HH-94-05-20
Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium on Improving Building Systems in Hot and Humid Climates, Arlington, TX, May 19-20, 1994 
utilities and regulators must exist before ESCOs 
can accurately and competitively price their 
services to utilities. The effective development of a 
productive partnership between the utility and the 
ESCOs will accurately link the utility's load 
management objectives with its customer's needs 
and with the capabilities offered by ESCOs. 
The importance of collaboration by 
utilities, ESCOs and other interested groups in the 
DSM bid program planning stage is essential to 
obtain agreement by the parties who are most 
affected by rulemaking proceedings. 
ESCOs can assist utilities by bearing many 
of the risks in developing and maintaining energy 
and capacity savings for utility customers. The 
benefits to utilities are postponed supply side 
construction risks and reduced capital recovery 
delay, good public relations and flexibility to meet 
changing load requirements. 
The future offers many opportunities for 
the effective delivery of DSM services through 
ESCO - utility partnerships which combine the 
financing and project management capabilities of 
ESCOs with the program planning resources of 
utilities. 
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